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How Much Money Did Wells Fargo Scam From Fake Accounts

Written By Tuesday, May 24, 2022 Add Comment Edit

Controversy generated by fraud perpetrated by Wells Fargo

The Wells Fargo account fraud scandal is a controversy brought virtually by the creation of millions of fraudulent savings and checking accounts on behalf of Wells Fargo clients without their consent. News of the fraud became widely known in late 2016 after various regulatory bodies, including the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), fined the company a combined United states$185 million every bit a result of the illegal activity. The visitor faces additional ceremonious and criminal suits reaching an estimated $2.7 billion by the stop of 2018.[i] The cosmos of these fake accounts continues to take legal and financial ramifications for Wells Fargo and former bank executives as of early 2021.[ii]

Wells Fargo clients began to observe the fraud after being charged unanticipated fees and receiving unexpected credit or debit cards or lines of credit. Initial reports blamed individual Wells Fargo co-operative workers and managers for the problem, likewise as sales incentives associated with selling multiple "solutions" or fiscal products. This blame was later shifted to a meridian-downwardly pressure from higher-level management to open as many accounts as possible through cantankerous-selling.

The banking company took relatively few risks in the years leading upward to the fiscal crisis of 2007–2008, which led to an image of stability on Wall Street and in the financial world. The banking concern's stable reputation was tarnished past the widespread fraud, the subsequent coverage, and the revelation of other fraudulent practices employed by the visitor. The controversy resulted in the resignation of CEO John Stumpf, an investigation into the bank led past U.Southward. Senator Elizabeth Warren, a number of settlements between Wells Fargo and various parties, and pledges from new management to reform the depository financial institution.

Background [edit]

Cantankerous-selling [edit]

Cross-selling, the practice underpinning the fraud, is the concept of attempting to sell multiple products to consumers. For instance, a customer with a checking business relationship might be encouraged to take out a mortgage, or prepare up credit bill of fare or online banking business relationship.[three] Success past retail banks was measured in role by the average number of products held by a customer, and Wells Fargo was long considered the well-nigh successful cross-seller.[4] Richard Kovacevich, the former CEO of Norwest Corporation and, after, Wells Fargo, allegedly invented the strategy while at Norwest.[v] [6] In a 1998 interview, Kovacevich likened mortgages, checking and savings accounts, and credit cards offered by the company to more typical consumer products, and revealed that he considered co-operative employees to be "salespeople", and consumers to be "customers" rather than "clients".[six] Nether Kovacevich, Norwest encouraged co-operative employees to sell at least eight products, in an initiative known equally "Going for Gr-Eight".

Early coverage [edit]

Wells Fargo's sales culture and cantankerous-selling strategy, and their impact on customers, were documented past the Wall Street Journal every bit early as 2011.[4] In 2013, a Los Angeles Times investigation revealed intense pressure on banking concern managers and individual bankers to produce sales against extremely ambitious and fifty-fifty mathematically incommunicable[six] quotas.[seven] In the Los Angeles Times commodity, CFO Timothy Sloan was quoted stating he was unaware of any "...overbearing sales culture". Sloan would later replace John Stumpf as CEO.

Under pressure from their supervisors, employees would often open accounts without customer consent. In an article from the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, Wells Fargo employees reportedly "opened as many as 1.five million checking and savings accounts, and more than 500,000 credit cards, without customers' authorization."[8] The employees received bonuses for opening new credit cards and checking accounts and enrolling customers in products such as online banking. California Treasurer John Chiang[9] stated: "Wells Fargo's fleecing of its customers ... demonstrates, at best, a reckless lack of institutional command and, at worst, a culture which actively promotes wanton greed."

Verschoor explains the findings of the Wells Fargo investigation shows employees as well opened online banking services and ordered debit cards without customer consent. "Blame is existence placed on the bank's marketing incentive plan, which set extremely high sales goals for employees to cross-sell additional banking products to existing customers whether or not the customers needed or wanted them."[9]

In 2010, New York Section of Financial Services (NY DFS) issued the Interagency Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies. These policies monitor incentive-based compensation structures, and requires that banks appropriately balance risk and rewards, exist compatible with effective controls and risk management, and that they are supported by effective corporate governance.[10]

Fraud [edit]

Employees were encouraged to society credit cards for pre-approved customers without their consent, and to utilize their ain contact data when filling out requests to prevent customers from discovering the fraud. Employees as well created fraudulent checking and savings accounts, a process that sometimes involved the motion of coin out of legitimate accounts. The creation of these boosted products was fabricated possible in part through a process known equally "pinning". By setting the client's Pivot to "0000", bankers were able to command client accounts and were able to enroll them in programs such as online banking.[11]

Measures taken by employees to satisfy quotas included the enrollment of the homeless in fee-accruing fiscal products.[seven] Reports of unreachable goals and inappropriate conduct past employees to supervisors did not effect in changes to expectations.[7]

After the Los Angeles Times article, the bank made nominal efforts to reform the visitor's sales culture.[12] Despite alleged reforms, the depository financial institution was fined $185 million in early September 2016 due to the creation of some 1,534,280 unauthorized deposit accounts and 565,433 credit-card accounts between 2011 and 2016.[11] Later estimates, released in May 2017, placed the number of fraudulent accounts at closer to a total of 3,500,000.[thirteen]

In December 2016, it was revealed that employees of the depository financial institution also issued unwanted insurance policies.[14] These included life insurance policies by Prudential Financial and renters' insurance policies by Assurant.[14] 3 whistle-blowers, Prudential employees, brought the fraud to light. Prudential later on fired these employees,[15] and announced that information technology might seek damages from Wells Fargo.[16]

Initial fines and broader coverage [edit]

John Stumpf, one-time CEO of Wells Fargo

Despite the earlier coverage in the Los Angeles Times, the controversy achieved national attention only in September 2016, with the announcement by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that the banking company would be fined $185 million for the illegal activity. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau received $100 million, the Los Angeles Metropolis Chaser received $50 million, and the Part of the Comptroller of the Currency received the last $35 one thousand thousand.[xi] The fines received substantial media coverage in the following days, and triggered attention from further interested parties.[17] [18]

Initial response from Wells Fargo and management [edit]

After news of the fines broke, the bank placed ads in newspapers taking responsibleness for the controversy.[19] Still, the depository financial institution rejected the notion that its sales civilization led to the actions of employees, stating "... [the fraud] was non role of an intentional strategy".[nineteen] Stumpf too expressed that he would be willing to accept some personal blame for the bug.

Company executives and spokespeople referred to the problem every bit an issue with sales practices, rather than the visitor's broader culture.[20]

Initial impact of the fraud, legal action, and press coverage [edit]

On Wells Fargo management [edit]

The depository financial institution fired approximately 5300 employees betwixt 2011 and 2016 as a result of fraudulent sales,[21] and discontinued sales quotas at its individual branches subsequently the announcement of the fine in September 2016.[22] John Shrewsberry, the banking concern's CFO, said the bank had invested $50 one thousand thousand to ameliorate oversight in private branches. Stumpf accepted responsibility for the problems, but in September 2016, when the story broke, indicated he had no plans to resign.[22]

Stumpf was subject field to a hearing before the Senate Banking Commission on September 21, 2016, in an effort led by Senator Elizabeth Warren.[23] Before the hearing, Stumpf agreed to forgo $41 one thousand thousand in stock options that had not nonetheless vested after being urged to do then by the visitor's board.[24] Stumpf resigned on October 12, roughly a month after the fines by the CFPB were announced, to be replaced by COO Timothy Sloan.[25] Sloan indicated there had not been internal pressure level for Stumpf'due south resignation, and that he had chosen to do so after "...deciding that the best thing for Wells Fargo to movement forward was for him to retire...".[24] In Nov 2016, the Role of the Comptroller of the Currency levied further penalties confronting the bank, removing provisions from the September settlement.[26] As a upshot of the OCC adding new restrictions, the banking company received oversight similar to that used for troubled or insolvent financial institutions.[26]

Stumpf received criticism for praising former head of retail cyberbanking, Carrie Tolstedt, upon her retirement earlier in 2016, given that the banking concern had been conducting an investigation into retail cyberbanking practices for several years at the fourth dimension.[27] In April 2017, the bank utilized a clawback provision in Stumpf'southward contract to take dorsum $28 million of his earnings.[28] Tolstedt was also forced to forfeit earnings, though she denied involvement.[28] Tolstedt was responsible for the pressure placed on heart management to dramatically increase the banking company'southward "cross-sell ratio", a metric for how many accounts each customer had.

The bank experienced decreased profitability in the first quarter after the news of the scandal broke.[29] Payments to law firms and other external directorate resulted in increased expenses.[29] Subsequently earnings were reported in Jan 2017, the banking concern announced it would close over 400 of its approximately 6000 branches by the end of 2018.[30] In May 2017, the bank announced that they would cut costs through investment in engineering while decreasing reliance on its "sales organisation".[31] The bank besides revised up its 2017 efficiency-ratio goal from 60 to 61.[31]

Wells Fargo costs [edit]

The CFPB fined Wells Fargo $100 million on September viii, 2016, for the "widespread illegal practice of secretly opening unauthorized accounts." The order also required Wells Fargo to pay an estimated $2.5 one thousand thousand in refunds to customers and hire an contained consultant to review its procedures.[32]

Wells Fargo incurred additional costs due to refunds and lawsuits:

  • $6.i million in client refunds due to inappropriate fees and charges;[33]
  • $142 1000000 in customer compensation due to a class-action settlement;[33]
  • $480 million settlement for a shareholder class-action lawsuit;[34] and
  • $575 million l-land Attorneys General (AG) settlement for a combination of opening unauthorized accounts and charging for unnecessary auto insurance and mortgage fees.[1]

The December 2018 AG settlement proclamation indicated that Wells Fargo had already paid $2.3 billion in settlements and consent orders, so its $575 million settlement brought the full to nearly $three billion.[1]

On consumers [edit]

Approximately 85,000 of the accounts opened incurred fees, totaling $2 million.[xi] Customers' credit scores were likewise probable hurt by the simulated accounts.[35] The depository financial institution was able to prevent customers from pursuing legal action equally the opening of an business relationship mandated customers enter into private mediation with the depository financial institution.[21]

The bank agreed to settle for $142 million with consumers who had accounts opened in their names without permission in March 2017.[36] [37] The money repaid fraudulent fees and paid damages to those affected.[37]

On non-management Wells Fargo employees [edit]

Wells Fargo employees described intense pressure level, with expectations of sales as high every bit xx products a solar day.[38] Others described frequent crying, levels of stress that led to vomiting, and severe panic attacks.[38] [12] At least i employee consumed manus sanitizer to cope with the pressure.[12] Some indicated that calls to the company'southward ethics hotline were met with either no reaction[38] or resulted in the termination of the employee making the call.[39]

During the period of the fraud, some Wells Fargo branch-level bankers encountered difficulty gaining employment at other banks. Banks issue U5 documents to departing employees, a record of whatsoever misbehavior or unethical conduct.[39] Wells Fargo issued defamatory U5 documents to bankers who reported branch-level malfeasance, indicating that they had been complicit in the cosmos of unwanted accounts,[39] a practice that received media attention as early as 2011.[40] There is no regulatory process to entreatment a defamatory U5, other than to file a lawsuit confronting the issuing corporation.

Wells Fargo created a special internal grouping to rehire employees who had left the bank but were non implicated in the scandal. In Apr 2017, Timothy Sloan stated that the depository financial institution would rehire some 1000 employees who had either been wrongfully terminated or who had quit in protest of fraud.[41] Sloan emphasized that those being rehired would not exist those who had participated in the creation of fake accounts.[41] The announcement was made shortly subsequently the news was released that the banking concern had clawed back income from both Carrie Tolstedt and John Stumpf.

Later government investigations and fines [edit]

First hearing [edit]

John Stumpf appeared earlier the Senate Banking Committee on September xx, 2016. Stumpf delivered prepared testimony and was then questioned. Senators, including Committee Chairman Richard Shelby, asked nigh whether the banking company would clawback income from executives and how the bank would help consumers information technology harmed.[42] Stumpf gave prepared testimony, but deferred from answering some of the questions, citing lack of expertise concerning the legal ramifications of the fraud.[42]

Elizabeth Warren referred to Stumpf'south leadership as "gutless" and told him he should resign.[42] Patrick Toomey expressed doubt that the 5300 employees fired by Wells Fargo had acted independently and without orders from supervisors or management.[42] Stumpf was later replaced as CEO by Tim Sloan, and Warren has expressed apprehension about leadership so closely associated with the period during which the fraud occurred. In October 2018, Warren urged the Fed Chairman to restrict whatever additional growth by Wells Fargo until Sloan is replaced as CEO.[43]

Other investigations [edit]

Prosecutors including Preet Bharara in New York Urban center, and others in San Francisco and Northward Carolina, opened their own investigations into the fraud.[44] The Securities and Exchange Commission opened its own investigation into the bank in November 2016.[45]

Maxine Waters, chair of the House Financial Services Committee, announced her intention to investigate the banking company further in early 2019. She previously released a report near the bank's malpractice, and had called for the government to dismantle the banking company.[46] [47] Former Wells Fargo Chairwoman Elizabeth "Betsy" Knuckles and James Quigley resigned on March 9, 2020, three days before House Commission on Fiscal Services hearings on the fraud scandal.[48]

The Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission reached a settlement with the banking concern in February 2020 for a total fine of United states of america$three billion to address the banking concern's criminal and ceremonious violations. All the same, this settlement does not embrace any futurity litigation against any individual employee of the banking company.[49]

In Nov 2020, the SEC filed civil charges against 2 former senior executives, Stumpf and Tolstead, accusing them of misrepresentation to investors of fundamental performance metrics.[50]

External reactions [edit]

Divestitures by major clients [edit]

In September 2016, California suspended its relationship with the bank.[51] John Chiang, the California State Treasurer, immediately removed the bank every bit bookrunner on two municipal bond issuings, suspended investments in Wells Fargo, and removed the banking company every bit the state's broker dealer.[51] Chiang cited the company'southward disregard for the well-being of Californians as the reason for the decision, and indicated the interruption would last for a year. Chiang later extended these sanctions confronting the bank to last for a 2nd year, citing the "... opaque manner with which the banking concern continues to do business concern and the frequency of new disclosures of wanton greed and lack of institutional command" equally his reasons for doing and so.[52]

The city of Chicago also divested $25 million invested with Wells Fargo in the same month every bit the actions taken by the state of California.[53] Additionally, Chicago alderman Edward M. Shush introduced a measure barring the city from doing business with the bank for two years.[53]

Other cities and municipalities that take either replaced or sought to supervene upon Wells Fargo include Philadelphia, which uses the banking concern to process payroll,[54] and the country of Illinois.[55] Seattle also ended its relationship with the bank in an effort led by Kshama Sawant. In add-on to the account controversy, Seattle cited the company's support of the Dakota Access Pipeline as a reason to end its relationship.[56]

Lawsuit by Navajo Nation [edit]

The Navajo Nation sued Wells Fargo in December 2017.[57] The lawsuit claims Wells Fargo employees told elderly members of the Navajo nation who did not speak English that checks could simply be cashed if they had Wells Fargo savings accounts. Wells Fargo was the merely bank that operated on a national scale with operations with the Navajo Nation. Wells Fargo settled with the Navajo Nation for $6.v million in August 2019.[58]

From the media [edit]

Wells Fargo survived the Great Recession more or less unharmed, even acquiring and rescuing a failing bank, Wachovia,[59] and the scandal tarnished the bank's reputation for relatively prudent management when compared to other large banks.[threescore] Politicians on both the left and the right, including Elizabeth Warren and Jeb Hensarling accept called for investigation across that done by the CFPB.[59]

Many reacted with surprise both to Stumpf's initial unwillingness to resign and the banking company'southward blaming the problem on lower-level employees.[61] [62]

In a fall 2019 commodity, management professor William Tayler and doctoral student Michael Harris analyzed the scandal as an case of the surrogation phenomenon.[63]

Legacy at Wells Fargo and long-term bear upon [edit]

Leadership implications [edit]

Tim Sloan, who became CEO after Stumpf, later resigned in March 2019 under pressure related to the scandal.[64] He was replaced by Charles Scharf, the erstwhile CEO of both Visa and BNY Mellon. Scharf was appointed with the expectation that he would rehabilitate the bank'southward reputation with regulators,[65] having previously overseen turnaround efforts at BNY Mellon. As of October 2020, Scharf had non introduced a comprehensive plan to address the problems faced by the bank;[66] this plan, announced in January 2021, was received skeptically by manufacture analysts.[67]

John Shrewsberry, CFO of the banking company since 2014, announced his retirement in mid-2020.[68] Mike Santomassimo, a "lieutenant" of Scharf'southward from BNY, replaced him.[69]

Financial and business implications [edit]

As of 2020, the ongoing regulatory scrutiny faced by Wells Fargo in response to the scandal continued to counterbalance on the bank'south functioning.[70] A growth cap, placed on Wells Fargo by the Federal Reserve, complemented by low interest rates, has made recovery difficult.[71] To reduce costs, executives under Scharf began reevaluating the depository financial institution's lines of business organisation in an attempt to trim or dispose of those exterior its core offerings.[72] The get-go major implication of this refocus was the sale of the banking company's student loan business in December 2020 to private equity firms Apollo and Blackstone.[72] As early on as October 2020, Wells Fargo was reported to be pursuing a sale of its asset management business, hoping to sell the entire sectionalization in a single transaction.[72] [73] Potential bidders for the asset management business include Minneapolis-based Ameriprise and Canadian investment management firm CI Financial.[74]

To amend accost its issues with compliance later news of the fraud bankrupt, Wells Fargo's management teams relied on external consultants and law firms.[75] Firms hired by the banking company to oversee compliance initially included McKinsey and Promontory Financial Grouping; these were after replaced by Oliver Wyman and PricewaterhouseCoopers. In mid-2020, CEO Charlie Scharf announced commitments to reducing the amount of authority conceded to these firms, in part to trim spending on external counsel equally high every bit $758 million a quarter. An employee, quoted in Financial Times, referred to the bank's caste of reliance on consultants every bit "off the charts" and even "comical".[75]

The cuts to spending on consultants were appear at the same fourth dimension as other cost-saving measures, chief amidst them layoffs.[76]

Workplace culture [edit]

Every bit of early 2019, employees at the bank indicated goals remained unrealistic.[77] [78]

Rebranding [edit]

On May vi, 2018, Wells Fargo launched an integrated marketing campaign chosen "Re-Established" to emphasize the company'due south commitment to re-establishing trust with existing and potential customers.[79] The television commercial opens with the bank's origins in the Old West, references the scandal and fast-forwards to describe banking concern employees and customers.[80]

Roughly a year later, in January 2019, the company announced another overhaul of their epitome, in a campaign called "This is Wells Fargo".[81]

Contemporaneous allegations [edit]

In April 2018, new allegations against Wells Fargo were reported, including signing unwitting customers upwardly for unnecessary machine insurance policies, with the possibility of an boosted $one billion fine.[82] The company later paid this fine.[47] The bank has also faced an investigation into the sales practices employed by the company'due south financial advisors.[81]

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wells_Fargo_account_fraud_scandal

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